Hardware Root of Trust (HRoT)
A Hardware Root of Trust is a physically isolated, tamper-resistant hardware component that serves as the foundational security anchor for an entire computing system. It provides an immutable starting point for cryptographic verification — the one element in the system that must be unconditionally trusted because its integrity is guaranteed by physical design, not software.
Why “Root”?
In cryptographic security, every verification depends on something else being verified first. This chain must start somewhere — at a “root” that cannot itself be compromised. A Hardware Root of Trust provides this root by storing initial verification keys in physically unextractable hardware (OTP fuses, ROM, or dedicated secure silicon).
Without a hardware root, any security built in software can be undermined: an attacker who controls boot firmware can defeat any encryption, authentication, or access control that loads after it.
How It Works
The Chain of Trust
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ HARDWARE ROOT OF TRUST (Immutable — ROM/OTP/Secure Element) │
│ Contains: Root public key, boot verification code │
└──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ Verifies signature of ↓
┌──────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 1 BOOTLOADER (First mutable code) │
│ Verified by: HRoT Verifies: Stage 2 bootloader │
└──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ Verifies signature of ↓
┌──────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 2 BOOTLOADER / OS KERNEL │
│ Verified by: Stage 1 Verifies: Application firmware │
└──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ Verifies signature of ↓
┌──────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ APPLICATION FIRMWARE │
│ Verified by: Stage 2 Executes: Normal device operation │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Every stage is cryptographically verified by the stage before it. If any stage fails verification, the boot process halts — preventing compromised firmware from executing.
Hardware Root of Trust Technologies
| Technology | Implementation | Certification | Used In |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secure Elements | Dedicated tamper-resistant IC (STSAFE-A110, OPTIGA Trust M, SE050) | CC EAL5+/EAL6+ | IoT devices, industrial controllers |
| TPM (Trusted Platform Module) | Discrete chip or firmware-based (fTPM) | TCG 2.0, FIPS 140-3 | Servers, PCs, automotive |
| ARM TrustZone | CPU-level isolation (Secure World / Normal World) | PSA Certified L1-L3 | MCUs (STM32, NXP i.MX) |
| OTP Fuses | One-time programmable memory in SoC | Varies by SoC vendor | All silicon — key hash storage |
| ROM Boot Code | Immutable code in mask ROM | Factory-verified | First-stage boot verification |
| DICE (Device Identifier Composition Engine) | TCG standard for layered device identity | TCG DICE | Constrained IoT, automotive |
Why CRA Mandates Hardware Root of Trust
The EU Cyber Resilience Act requires products with digital elements to implement:
- Secure boot — which is only secure if anchored in hardware.
- Tamper-resistant key storage — software-only key storage fails this requirement.
- Unforgeable device identity — requires hardware attestation, not clonable software IDs.
- Authenticated firmware updates — signing keys must be stored in tamper-resistant hardware.
The regulatory bottom line: If your MCU doesn’t have a physical secure enclave or Secure Element, you cannot claim CRA compliance by adding software. The silicon must change.
Software Root of Trust vs. Hardware Root of Trust
| Aspect | Software Root of Trust | Hardware Root of Trust |
|---|---|---|
| Key storage | Flash memory (readable with JTAG/SWD) | Tamper-resistant silicon (physically unextractable) |
| Boot verification | Can be bypassed by overwriting flash | Immutable ROM code — cannot be modified |
| Attack resistance | Vulnerable to firmware dumps, glitching | Designed to resist physical attacks (mesh shields, sensors) |
| Cost | Free (software only) | €0.50–€3.00 per unit (Secure Element) |
| CRA compliance | ❌ Does not satisfy “tamper-resistant” requirement | ✅ Satisfies hardware security requirements |
| Certification | Cannot be certified at high assurance levels | CC EAL5+, EAL6+, FIPS 140-3 |
Related Terms
- Secure Boot — The process that uses the Hardware Root of Trust to verify firmware integrity at every boot stage.
- Secure Element — A discrete tamper-resistant chip commonly used as the Hardware Root of Trust.
- HSM — Hardware Security Modules that provide Root of Trust at server/infrastructure level.
- CRA — The EU regulation that mandates Hardware Root of Trust for connected products.